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Abstract
The Tor anonymity system provides online privacy for
millions of users, but it is slower than typical web brows-
ing. To improve Tor performance, we propose Predic-
Tor, a path selection technique that uses a Random For-
est classifier trained on recent measurements of Tor to
predict the performance of a proposed path. If the path
is predicted to be fast, the client then builds a circuit us-
ing those relays. We implemented PredicTor in the Tor
source code and show through live Tor experiments and
Shadow simulations that PredicTor improves Tor net-
work performance by 11% to 23% compared to Vanilla
Tor and by 7% to 13% compared to the previous state-
of-the-art scheme. Our experiments show that PredicTor
is the first path selection algorithm to dynamically avoid
highly congested nodes during times of high congestion
and avoid long-distance paths during times of low con-
gestion. We evaluate the anonymity of PredicTor us-
ing standard entropy-based and time-to-first-compromise
metrics, but these cannot capture the possibility of leak-
age due to the use of location in path selection. To better
address this, we propose a new anonymity metric called
CLASI: Client Autonomous System Inference. CLASI is
the first anonymity metric in Tor that measures an adver-
sary’s ability to infer client Autonomous Systems (ASes)
by fingerprinting circuits at the network, country, and re-
lay level. We find that CLASI shows anonymity loss for
location-aware path selection algorithms, where entropy-
based metrics show little to no loss of anonymity. Ad-
ditionally, CLASI indicates that PredicTor has similar
sender AS leakage compared to the current Tor path se-
lection algorithm due to PredicTor building circuits that
are independent of client location.
1 Introduction
Privacy threats on today’s Internet include targeted ad-
vertising, large-scale user profiling, and dragnet surveil-
lance by government agencies. These threats, along with
the desire to protect freedom of speech and overcome
censorship on the Internet, have resulted in an increase
in public interest for anonymity systems. The Tor Net-
work [13] in particular has received enormous attention
and currently serves millions of users from all over the
world. Tor users can connect to the Internet through an
encrypted tunnel by first building a path through three
Tor routers (called a circuit) chosen from a set of approx-
imately 7,000 volunteer routers. Part of Tor’s anonymity
is attributed to the size of the user base, called the
anonymity set, and attracting a large anonymity set is
thus important for privacy of Tor users.
Performance. Unfortunately, Tor is slower than typi-
cal web browsing. Several groups have proposed new
circuit-building approaches that aim to improve perfor-
mance by optimizing properties such as bandwidth or la-
tency. Wacek et al. [41] examined these approaches and
determined that Congestion-Aware Routing (CAR) [42]
offered the best performance-anonymity trade-off. CAR
is a decentralized approach, where clients opportunisti-
cally measure circuit congestion during circuit creation
and select the best one for use. This decentralized ap-
proach is limited because clients only have a small subset
of relevant congestion information. Global knowledge of
congestion in Tor and performance of circuits more gen-
erally would enable better choices for all clients.
Building on this insight, we propose PredicTor, a path
selection technique that leverages performance measure-
ments of many circuits to select less congested nodes
and geographically shorter paths with greater probabil-
ity. PredicTor uses a Random Forest classifier trained on
recent measurements of Tor circuits to predict the per-
formance of a proposed path. If the path is predicted
to be fast, then a circuit is built using those relays. We
implemented PredicTor in the Tor source code and show
through simulations in Shadow that PredicTor improves
Tor network performance by 23% compared to Vanilla
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Tor and by 13% compared to CAR. This resulted in a
speed up over Vanilla of over 500ms in the median case,
and over 1.5s in the 90th percentile.
Moreover, we performed live Tor experiments and
show that PredicTor improves network performance
partly due to avoiding highly congested nodes, and partly
due to building lower latency circuits. In fact, PredicTor
is the first path selection algorithm that dynamically con-
siders both congestion and latency according to the state
of the live Tor Network. In the live Tor experiments, dur-
ing times of high congestion, we show an improvement
of 7%-13% in the median case for PredicTor compared
to Vanilla Tor.
Measuring Anonymity. Any proposal for building ef-
ficient Tor circuits must thoroughly evaluate anonymity.
For example, a method that focuses on using high-
bandwidth relays could concentrate traffic into fewer
nodes, making it easier for a few attackers to compro-
mise more circuits. Unfortunately, existing metrics do
not address all aspects of Tor that need to be considered
in evaluating new path selection proposals.
Current anonymity metrics fall into two complimen-
tary categories: methods that aim to quantify anonymity
and metrics that empirically measure all-or-nothing com-
promises. Most metrics that quantify anonymity are
based on entropy [31, 11, 30]. Syverson [38] points
out that while entropy-based metrics represent the aver-
age case well, they do not represent worst-case scenar-
ios well. Other quantification methods [5, 4] perform
information theoretic inferences about Tor clients with
probability equal to 1/|N|+δ where N is the number of
clients, and δ is the degree to which the inference is suc-
cessful beyond a best guess. Due to the large user base
in Tor, these inference probabilities can be minuscule.
Therefore, it is difficult to justify how these inference
probabilities may indicate an advantage for an adversary
to fully compromise anonymity.
The latter category, metrics that empirically measure
all-or-nothing compromises, includes time-to-first com-
promise, a measure of how long it takes until a client
uses a compromised circuit [24]. Though such met-
rics give us a good understanding of properties that lead
to full deanonymization, they offer less insight into the
state of anonymity for users that have not been fully
deanonymized. As such, we need a metric that of-
fers some insight into the state of anonymity before full
deanonymization and one that shows an adversary’s abil-
ity to infer key attributes about the user.
In this work, we present an anonymity metric called
CLASI (Client AS Inference). CLASI measures an all-
knowing adversary’s ability to infer clients’ Autonomous
Systems (ASes) by fingerprinting their circuits at the net-
work and country level, along with other auxiliary infor-
mation such as relay bandwidth. We give our adversary
full knowledge of all the connections in the Tor Network,
and our results thus represent an upper bound. Informa-
tion revealed about the clients’ AS, rather than the client
directly, could potentially be more useful for adversaries
for several reasons:
– The number of popular Tor client ASes is far lower
than the number of Tor clients. Thus, inferring a
client’s AS is more achievable and may be a first step
in reconnaissance for an adversary;
– High-resource adversaries such as nation-states are
known to target ASes for infiltration in efforts to pas-
sively observe network traffic;
– Making inferences at the client level may yield negli-
gible results due to Pr[1/|N|+δ ] being small in most
cases, especially when N is large.
We evaluate this method empirically by testing a re-
cently proposed location-aware algorithm called De-
NASA [6]. Comparing DeNASA to Vanilla Tor, we find
anonymity loss using CLASI that is not apparent when
using entropy-based metrics. We note that DeNASA is
not a performance-based path selection algorithm, but
rather that it seeks to improve security by routing around
network-level adversaries to avoid traffic analysis at-
tacks. Thus, CLASI can be useful for evaluating other
such algorithms [14, 35, 6, 23, 17] and for schemes that
seek to avoid active BGP hijacking attacks [37, 36].
Finally, we evaluate the anonymity of PredicTor using
both CLASI and entropy-based metrics. We find that AS
leakage for PredicTor is similar to Vanilla and slightly
better than CAR due to PredicTor clients building paths
independently of their own network location.
Contributions In summary, we make the following
contributions:
1. We show circuit classification accuracy for machine
learning algorithms that are trained using data cur-
rently available from the Tor consensus files.
2. We present PredicTor, implement it in the Tor
source code and show significant performance ben-
efits in Shadow simulations.
3. We perform live Tor experiments and show that Pre-
dicTor is the first path selection algorithm to dy-
namically optimize for congestion and path length
depending on path conditions.
4. We present the CLASI anonymity metric. Our
evaluation shows that CLASI indicates anonymity
loss for location-aware path selection algorithms
where entropy-based metrics show little to no loss
of anonymity.
5. We evaluate PredicTor with CLASI and other met-
rics and find that PredicTor’s path selection main-
tains high anonymity.
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2 Background and Related Work
Tor is a low-latency anonymity system for TCP-based
applications [13]. The Tor network comprises approxi-
mately 7000 volunteer-operated relays [26] that are de-
ployed throughout the world. It was recently shown by
Jansen et al. [21] that Tor has approximately 550,000 ac-
tive users at any given time. Each client selects a three-
hop path of relays and builds a multi-hop encrypted tun-
nel, called a circuit, through this path. The first, middle,
and last relays on the circuit are called the guard, middle,
and exit relays, respectively.
A client uses a single guard node as the first hop for all
of its circuits to help prevent attacks such as the prede-
cessor attack [43, 44, 29], the selective denial of service
attack [7], and statistical profiling. A new guard is cho-
sen only if the presently selected guard becomes unavail-
able, or if a period of 60 days to 9 months is reached [12].
To provide fast connections for web browsing, relays
are selected for circuits such that traffic is evenly dis-
tributed over the available bandwidth in the Tor Net-
work. A set of directory servers are responsible for
securely maintaining the list of relays, along with their
bandwidths and other information. Once per hour, each
client receives a consensus document from the directory
servers, and this document contains weights assigned to
each relay based on the relay’s position in the circuit and
its bandwidth. Then, load balancing is achieved by se-
lecting each relay in proportion to its consensus weights.
2.1 Improving Network Performance
Tor is slower than typical web browsing, and a number
of research groups have attempted to address this [34, 33,
1]. Wacek et al. [41] examined these approaches and de-
termined that Congestion-Aware Routing (CAR) [42] of-
fered the best performance-anonymity trade-off. In this
paper, we thus use CAR as a benchmark for comparison.
CAR aims to intelligently select Tor circuits with the
lowest levels of congestion. Congestion measurements
for circuits are performed by the clients by sampling
round-trip times (RTTs) of both circuit-building and ap-
plication connections. A circuit is selected for use only
if it’s measured congestion time (the current RTT minus
the shortest RTT) is the lowest out of three randomly se-
lected circuits. If at any point during the life of that cir-
cuit, the mean of the last five congestion times is greater
than 0.5 seconds, the client will switch to another circuit.
2.2 Measuring Anonymity
The existing literature provides substantial contributions
in measuring Tor’s anonymity [31, 11, 34, 30, 5]. Our
approach, CLASI, builds on the AnoA framework pro-
posed by Backes et al. [4] for computing quantitative
bounds on the anonymity in Tor. The AnoA framework
is modeled as a challenge-response game between an ad-
versary and a challenger. The adversary possesses two
tables (D0 and D1) in which each line is populated with
a sender, a receiver, and auxiliary information. The two
tables differ in exactly one row in the sender field. For
this special row, the sender field for D0 contains sender
S0, and the sender field for D1 contains sender S1. The
adversary A sends tables (D0 and D1) to a challenger CH.
The challenger chooses Db according to its input b where
b ⊆ {0,1}, and successively feeds each row to an ideal-
ized Tor protocol. At any point, the adversary outputs
their decision b. Sender anonymity for this protocol is
then measured in terms of δ where:
Pr[b= 0 : 0←A,CH(0)]≤Pr[b= 0 : 0←A,CH(1)]+δ .
As anonymity of the protocol decreases, δ increases due
to the fact that adversary A guesses b correctly with
greater probability.
We use a framework similar to AnoA as the foundation
for designing our CLASI metric. The most important and
distinguishing characteristics of the CLASI metric are:
– We equip the adversary with a probabilistic classifica-
tion model trained on realistic Tor simulated data.
– Our adversary is all-knowing, and thus our metric pro-
vides an upper-bound.
– Our adversary classification model is configured to in-
fer the Autonomous System of the client.
In the CLASI classification model, we use three fea-
tures for each relay in a circuit: the bandwidth of
the relay from the consensus file (BW), and the net-
work (AS) and country (CC) that the relay is located
in. We decided to use AS, CC, and BW features be-
cause the proposed path selection algorithms in Tor are
generally designed to optimize performance or security
based on relay bandwidth [34], network location of re-
lays [1, 33], or by routing around relays that located in
certain ASes [14, 35, 6, 23]. We measure an all-knowing
adversary’s ability to infer clients’ ASes because knowl-
edge of the clients’ AS is a probable first step for adver-
sary reconnaissance. The CLASI design and evaluation
are described in Sections 6 and 7, respectively.
2.3 Related Work
Routing Protocols. Snader and Borisov [34] proposed
a change to Tor’s path selection algorithm that allows
the client to tune the degree to which relay selection is
weighted in proportion to bandwidth. The tunable pa-
rameter can be increased to bias relay selection in favor
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of high bandwidth relays or decreased to reduce that bias
and induce more uniform relay selection. A limitation of
this approach is that selecting relays weighted too heav-
ily towards bandwidth can cause high-bandwidth relays
to become overloaded and low-bandwidth relays to be-
come starved, resulting in poor performance.
Sherr et al. [33] proposed a latency-aware relay selec-
tion strategy in which relays participate in a virtual co-
ordinate embedding system. Clients then estimate the
latencies of anonymous circuits by summing the vir-
tual distances between relays’ advertised coordinates.
Akhoondi et al. [1] proposed an approach that aims to
reduce latency of paths by accounting for inferred loca-
tions of relays while choosing paths. Some limitations to
these approaches were pointed out by Wacek et al. [41],
who performed an empirical study in which they com-
pared the routing protocols mentioned above. Their re-
sults indicate that relay selection algorithms perform best
when bandwidth is considered as a factor. Moreover,
CAR was shown to perform close to the best in through-
put and time-to-first-byte, in addition to significantly out-
performing other algorithms in anonymity.
One important disadvantage of CAR is that circuit-
RTTs can be manipulated during circuit creation by ma-
licious exit nodes. This disadvantage is compounded in
another similar approach called Navigator [3], in which
active RTT measurements and a-priori information from
the distribution of globally measured RTT values are
used to select circuits. Additionally, Geddes et. al [15]
suggested that the use of RTT measurements for latency
improvements also results in an increase in the effective-
ness of latency-based attacks.
More recently, Geddes et al. [16] proposed ABRA (the
avoiding bottlenecks relay algorithm). Their approach
aims to increase network utilization by having relays
estimate the extent to which they are a bottleneck on
each circuit and spread this information to clients. They
showed that ABRA results had better network utilization
compared to CAR. However, they did not show results
for time-to-first-byte or time-to-last-byte measurements,
so there is no evidence that ABRA offers any improve-
ment in these measures of end-user performance.
Anonymity Metrics. Existing anonymity metrics for
Tor can be categorized into works that use information
theoretic or rigorous methods to quantify anonymity of
Tor users and works that aim to empirically measure
all-or-nothing compromises of Tor users. Our proposed
anonymity metric lies within the former category.
In the area of quantifying anonymity, Serjantov and
Danezis [31] and Diaz et al. [11] propose using Shan-
non entropy [32] to measure the uncertainty of the dis-
tribution of guard/exit pairs selected by senders. Rochet
et al. [30] proposed a metric based on guessing entropy
that indicates the expected number of nodes that must be
compromised in order to mount a successful correlation
attack. Snader and Borisov [34] apply the Gini coeffi-
cient to measure the equality of selection probability for
Tor relays. A Gini coefficient of 0 means all relays were
chosen with equal frequency (maximal anonymity), and
a coefficient of 1 means the same relay was always cho-
sen (minimal anonymity).
One limitation for entropy based metrics – pointed out
by Syverson [38] – is that the results can be misleading
because the worst case is not always represented. Addi-
tionally, entropy does not indicate a loss in anonymity if
clients select relays differently, as long as the distribution
of selected relays is near uniform. To consider an ex-
treme example, suppose client A always selects relay X
and client B always selects relay Z; the entropy would be
1. This is a misleading result in terms of anonymity be-
cause both clients are fully identifiable with knowledge
of their selected relay.
To establish tight upper bounds on anonymity, Meiser
et al. [5] presented a rigorous methodology for quantify-
ing anonymity of Tor with respect to budget adversaries.
In their analysis, they show anonymity impact for a sys-
tem with two senders connecting to two receivers using
several proposed path selection algorithms over an ide-
alized Tor network. Their analysis, however, does not
show anonymity impact for users who are masked within
large anonymity sets or for varying user destinations. In
our proposed metric, these parameters are tunable, al-
lowing researchers to understand anonymity impact for
different client models and different user models.
In the area of empirical measurement – being com-
plimentary to anonymity quantification metrics such as
our proposal – Johnson et al. [24] measured time to first
compromise by relay-level and AS-level adversaries by
modeling the Tor network and taking empirical measure-
ments. Murdoch and Watson [28] presented an analysis
of proposed path selection algorithms against adversaries
that deploy malicious Tor nodes. Sun et al. [36] proposed
a metric that measures the resilience of the Tor network
to active attacks on BGP routing called RAPTOR attacks.
These empirical measurement approaches are compli-
mentary to our proposed metric because they measure
all-or-nothing compromises, while our metric quantifies
the ability of an all-knowing adversary to infer clients’
ASes – a property that could lead to a compromise and
thus indicates a loss of anonymity for path selection al-
gorithms under study.
3 Path Classification
In this section, we motivate the design of PredicTor by
first showing machine learning classification results for
k-NN and Random Forest models trained on Tor descrip-
tor data. Our goal is to classify Tor circuits into two
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Figure 1: Effect of varying τ on accuracy, false positive rate, and false negative rate for k-NN and Random Forest in
(a) Shadow and (b) Live Tor. (c) TTLB for Shadow perf clients compared to live Tor perf [26] for 50KiB downloads.
classes: fast and slow. We used two distinct methods
for acquiring the training data and show results for both.
Shadow Data. In the first method, we ran a Tor net-
work simulation with 1000 clients using Shadow [20],
a discrete-time event simulator. More details about the
simulation are discussed at the end of this section. We
generated a training set of 120,000 streams from one sim-
ulation run and a testing set of 25,000 streams from an-
other simulation run. Each stream consisted of a Vanilla
client downloading a file from a server through a cir-
cuit. For each stream, we recorded the time-to-last-
byte (TTLB) download time that was measured from the
client during the simulation. We then set a threshold τ
and labeled each data point as True if the TTLB was less
than τ , i.e. the stream was fast, and False if the TTLB
was greater than τ , i.e. the stream was slow.
Live Tor Data. In the second method, we gathered
training data from the live Tor Network by deploying
a server that hosted 20 VMs, each running Tor version
0.3.0.9. From each VM, circuits were built over the
live Tor network and requests were made to download
an 80 KiB file from a US destination server. For each
file download, we measured the time-to-last-byte down-
load time. The labels were then set to True if the TTLB
was less than τ , and False if the TTLB was greater than
τ . Using this technique, we collected approximately
50,000 training samples on Dec. 5, 2017 from approxi-
mately 17:00 to 18:00 GMT. Then, during the subsequent
hour (18:00 to 19:00 GMT), we collected approximately
20,000 testing samples .
Feature Set. In Tor circuits, there is a relationship be-
tween download times and the consensus bandwidth of
each relay, as well as between download times and the
network location of each relay. Due to this relationship,
we believe that a recognizable pattern exists such that
download times can be predicted (to some degree) by in-
specting bandwidth and network location of each relay
in a circuit. As such, we resolve each relay into three
features: 1) Autonomous System (AS), 2) Country Code
(CC), and 3) Consensus Bandwidth (BW). This yields
nine features for the circuit in total. For the AS features,
we use the AS number directly as an integer. For the CC
features, we use the decimal representation in ASCII of
the two-character country code. For the BW features, the
consensus bandwidth is used and represented as an inte-
ger. We used distance-weighted k-NN with k = 9 [27],
and Random Forests [8] to classify each circuit into class
True (Fast) or False (Slow).
Classification Accuracy. Figures 1a and 1b show the
accuracy, false positive rate, and false negative rate of
the k-NN and Random Forest models in predicting circuit
performance with respect to varying τ . For both models,
as τ increases, we observed an increase in false positive
rate and a decrease in false negative rate. The false posi-
tive rate and false negative rate converge near the median
download time for the training data. The median down-
load time for Shadow and Live Tor was approximately
1.8s and 1.4s, respectively. The Shadow results in Fig-
ure 1a show the accuracy at the median to be 76% and
70% for Random Forest and k-NN, respectively. The
false positive rate and false negative rate at the median
was approximately 25% for both k-NN and Random For-
est. The Live Tor results in Figure 1b show the accuracy
at the median to be 70% and 64% for Random Forest
and k-NN, respectively. The false positive rate and false
negative rate at the median was approximately 45% and
28%, respectively, for both k-NN and Random Forest.
For both Shadow and Live Tor models, accuracy is
minimal at the median download time. For greater val-
ues of τ , both accuracy and false positive rate increase.
Likewise, for lower values of τ , both accuracy and false
negative rate increase. In the context of predicting fast
circuits for Tor clients, high values of τ allow clients to
accept a large percentage of slow circuits due to the high
false positive rate. Low values of τ cause clients to be-
come more selective in general and lead to dramatically
higher circuit build times. Based on these results, we use
Random Forest for PredicTor’s classification model with
the τ parameter always set to the median download time
with respect to the training data.
Shadow Simulation Details. Our Shadow configu-
ration consisted of 1000 clients from the top 10 coun-
tries by directly connecting users [26], 400 relays from a
live Tor Consensus, and 70 destination servers from the
Alexa list of top websites [2]—forming a client to relay
ratio of 2.5 : 1. All clients and relays were assigned to an
enhanced network topology of 17,250 vertices and 150
Million edges based on their AS [19]. In this simula-
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tion, there were two classes of clients, web clients, and
perf clients. Web clients randomly selected servers from
which they performed HTTP GET requests to download
320 KiB files over the modeled Tor network [18], and
perf clients downloaded 50 KiB files over the Tor net-
work. Each client measured the time from when the first
request was made to when the last byte was received
(TTLB). We validated our Tor model against live Tor by
comparing the results of perf clients to historical Tor data
from Tor Metrics [26]. Figure 1c shows the live Tor per-
formance for fixed file size downloads of 50 KiB from
historical Tor network data [26] compared to Shadow
perf clients. The results show that live Tor performance
was not significantly different than Shadow perf client
performance for our simulation, indicating that our Tor
model performs statistically similar to live Tor.
4 Speeding up Tor with PredicTor
We now describe PredicTor, our proposed approach for
improving Tor path selection. In PredicTor, the guard se-
lection policy is identical to Vanilla Tor, and a client will
use a single guard as long as it is available for up to nine
months. To complete a path, middle and exit relays are
selected according to consensus bandwidth weights as
per standard Tor protocol. The resulting proposed circuit
is then classified by a classification model as described in
Section 3. If the proposed circuit is predicted to be fast,
the circuit is built; otherwise, new relays are selected.
Let us define function Mτ(C) that, for a given thresh-
old τ , returns True when a proposed circuit C is predicted
to be faster than τ and False when it is predicted to be
slower than τ . In the PredicTor path selection method,
Tor proposes C as per standard bandwidth weighted se-
lection. Then, if Mτ(C) == True, the circuit is built.
Otherwise, the loop runs until the condition is met. Note
that when τ is set to be the median download time, then
the loop runs two times on average, though this can vary
between clients and depends on the guard selected.
Experimental Setup. We implemented PredicTor in
the Tor source code and tested its performance compared
to Vanilla, Congestion-aware routing (CAR), and Snader
and Borisov (SB) path selection using both Shadow and
live Tor. Prior work shows that SB has competitive per-
formance under medium congestion with the parameter
s set to 9 [41, 34]. We tested SB with two settings: SB-9,
with s = 9 for partial bias to high bandwidth and SB-15,
with s = 15 for heavy bias to high bandwidth.
In the Shadow simulation, we used the same config-
uration as described in section 3. For all path selection
techniques, the respective clients requested a 320 KiB
file download from a server selected uniformly at ran-
dom from a set of 70 destination servers.
In the live Tor experiments, for all path selection tech-
niques, the respective clients requested the home page of
websites selected uniformly at random from a set of 1000
sites from the Alexa list of top sites [2].
For the PredicTor experiment in both Shadow and live
Tor, τ was set to the median download time with re-
spect to the training set, and Random Forest was used
for the classification model. Note that in a Shadow simu-
lation, we can observe how performance is affected when
all clients use a given path selection technique. This
is not possible in live Tor because we can only deploy
an insignificant fraction of clients compared to the full
user base. However, two of Shadow’s limitations are:
1) the network size is significantly smaller than the real-
world Tor Network, and 2) the simulation does not fully
model real-world network dynamics. In live Tor, we
can observe how path selection techniques respond un-
der dynamic real-world network conditions. Therefore,
for measuring performance of path selection techniques,
it is useful to test in both Shadow and live Tor.
Performance Results. Figures 2a and 3a show Shadow
and live Tor download times for Vanilla, PredicTor, CAR,
SB-9, and SB-15. In both Shadow and live Tor, Predic-
Tor was the fastest. In the Shadow simulation, PredicTor
had a 23% and 13% median improvement compared to
Vanilla and CAR, respectively, and a 28% improvement
in the 90th percentile compared to Vanilla. This resulted
in a speed up over Vanilla of over 500ms in the median
case, and over 1.5s in the 90th percentile. In the live
Tor experiments, PredicTor had 11% and 6% median im-
provements compared to Vanilla and CAR, respectively,
and a 28% improvement in the 90th percentile compared
to Vanilla. This resulted in a speed up of over 1.0 second
in the 90th percentile compared to Vanilla.
Circuit Bandwidth. SB-9 and SB-15 performed the
slowest in both Shadow and live Tor. Figures 2b and 3b
show the Shadow and live Tor circuit consensus band-
widths for Vanilla, PredicTor, SB-9, and SB-15. As
expected, SB-9 and SB-15 build circuits with signifi-
cantly higher bandwidth compared to other techniques,
particularly in live Tor, where SB-9 and SB-15 circuits
used 22% and 97% more bandwidth in the median than
Vanilla. The Shadow results suggest that selecting relays
weighted heavily towards bandwidth causes high band-
width relays to become overloaded, resulting in poor per-
formance. Moreover, the live Tor performance and con-
sensus bandwidth results suggest that high-bandwidth re-
lays experience some persistent congestion due to a large
user base using Vanilla’s bandwidth-weighted selection
policy. The persistent congestion causes poor perfor-
mance even if one client wights their selection heavily
toward these high bandwidth relays.
Performance gains in PredicTor, on the other hand,
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Figure 3: Live Tor Experiments: a) TTLB. b) Circuit consensus bandwidth. c) Circuit length.
cannot be attributed exclusively to selecting high-
bandwidth relays. In Shadow, PredicTor did not build
higher bandwidth circuits compared to Vanilla. In live
Tor, Predictor uses approximately the same median con-
sensus bandwidth as Vanilla, though it uses 25% more
bandwidth at the 90th percentile.
Node Congestion. Wang et al. [42] concluded that con-
gestion is a property of the Tor router itself. Though con-
gestion comes in bursts in the short term, each node’s
congestion characteristics do persist over time, and thus
some nodes are consistently more congested than others.
Figure 2c shows the empirical distribution (ECDF)
of relays with respect to the percent of circuits that
they were used on for the Shadow simulation. Vanilla
completely avoided selecting approximately 45% of re-
lays in the network, and SB-9 and SB-15 completely
avoided selecting approximately 50% of relays in the
network. Under-utilizing the network in this way caused
more persistent congestion on the 65% and 50% of re-
lays that Vanilla and SB did utilize, respectively. On
the other hand, PredicTor utilized approximately 85%
of the network. These results suggest that, when all
clients use PredicTor, more relays are utilized, resulting
in greater load distribution and lower persistent conges-
tion for high-bandwidth relays.
PredicTor+CAR. One advantage for PredicTor com-
pared to CAR is that clients have more global knowl-
edge of persistent network congestion for all nodes dur-
ing circuit creation. This helps PredicTor clients avoid
consistently congested nodes and select consistently non-
congested nodes with greater probability. In CAR, on
the other hand, clients only have knowledge of conges-
tion characteristics for a small subset of nodes that are
opportunistically measured during circuit creation.
We combined PredicTor with CAR because we sus-
pected that CAR should have better performance if nodes
are selected using the PredicTor scheme first, then op-
portunistically measured. Figure 2a shows a 28% im-
provement in the median case for PredicTor+CAR com-
pared to Vanilla. These results indicate that a hybridized
scheme combining centralized and decentralized conges-
tion measurements for relay selection results in better
performance compared to either scheme alone.
Circuit Length. Although geographic distance is not a
good measure for Internet latency, it can provide a point
of reference for a system like Tor, where a circuit might
traverse multiple intercontinental hops. Figure 3c shows
live Tor circuit lengths for Vanilla, CAR, and PredicTor.
To measure circuit lengths, we first resolved each relay
into coordinates. Then, we calculated the distance be-
tween relays using Vincenty’s Formula [40]. The circuit
length was taken as the sum of the distances between the
guard and middle and between the middle and exit. In the
median case, PredicTor built circuits that were approxi-
mately 680 km shorter compared to Vanilla. In the 90th
percentile, PredicTor and CAR built circuits that were
approximately 592 km and 2,043 km shorter compared to
Vanilla, respectively. These results suggest that the per-
formance gains for PredicTor and CAR are partially due
to building shorter circuits, and thus, circuits of lower
latency.
4.1 Discussion
We conclude that performance gains for PredicTor are
achieved by considering three key factors: 1) congestion,
2) bandwidth, and 3) latency. From the Shadow simula-
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tion, we observed that PredicTor utilizes the network in
a way that leads to more efficient load distribution and
lower congestion for high-bandwidth nodes. Addition-
ally, the live Tor results suggest that PredicTor avoids
highly congested nodes while building circuits of slightly
higher bandwidth and lower latency compared to Vanilla.
Quantifying improvement. Our experiments provide
strong evidence that PredicTor should result in an overall
improvement for all clients in Tor, with 23% improve-
ment in Shadow with all clients using PredicTor and 11%
improvement in the live Tor experiments with one client
using PredicTor. We do not claim, however, that our ex-
periments can show the exact quantitative gains that Pre-
dicTor would provide when deployed in Tor. One way to
more fully quantify the improvement for a live deploy-
ment of PredicTor would be to test in a wide-area testbed
where all clients use PredicTor. Since no such testbed
was available for this study, we leave this for future work.
Malicious Relays. We also highlight some important
mitigation steps against relays that attempt to manipulate
their bandwidth contribution during live PredicTor mea-
surements to win more traffic. First, PredicTor selects
guards exactly the same way as Vanilla, by consensus
weight. Thus, malicious relays cannot win more guard
traffic because they do not have the ability to change
their consensus weight by gaming PredicTor measure-
ments. A malicious exit relay may attempt to win more
traffic by prioritizing measurement circuits and throttling
all other connections, thereby appearing fast during mea-
surement. This can be mitigated by selecting probe desti-
nations from the distribution of most popular destination
websites as observed from (honest) exit nodes, reported
safely using a system like PrivCount [22]. Since pop-
ularity of websites is heavily concentrated in relatively
few sites [10], a moderate-sized list of probe destinations
should suffice to make the attacker unable to distinguish
quickly between a measurement circuit and the majority
of non-measurement user activity.
In contrast, a major disadvantage for methods that use
RTT measurements such as CAR and Navigator is that
malicious exit nodes can easily manipulate RTT mea-
surements. Geddes et. al [15] show how the use of RTT
measurements for latency improvements results in an in-
crease in the effectiveness of latency-based attacks.
5 Client Location and Guard Diversity
We performed additional live Tor experiments from three
additional client locations: 1) United States (US), 2)
Germany (DE), and 3) Japan (JP). For each client loca-
tion, the experiment was performed during prime Inter-
net surfing hours for both the US and Europe (approxi-
mately 14:00 GMT) and during a time that is evening in
the US and middle of the night in Europe (approximately
00:00 GMT). We call the experiments run at 14:00 GMT
as the high-congestion condition and the experiments run
at 00:00 GMT as the low-congestion condition.
Due to the single-guard selection strategy in Tor,
clients may be connected to a slow or fast guard for long
periods of time. We desire to understand PredicTor per-
formance when connected to guard nodes of various con-
sensus weights. Thus, for each client location, the ex-
periment was performed using a slow guard (consensus
weight 1770) and a fast guard (consensus weight 35600).
In Appendix A, Table 1, we show the median and
90th percentile improvement for PredicTor compared to
Vanilla. We observed that the best performance improve-
ment from PredicTor was realized during times of high
congestion while connected to a fast guard. From the US
location, there was a 9.7% and 17.7% improvement in
the median and 90th percentile, respectively. From the
DE location, there was a 12.8% and 25.3% improvement
in the median and 90th percentile, respectively. From the
JP location, there was a 6.3% and 10.8% improvement in
the median and 90th percentile, respectively.
During times of low congestion while connected to a
fast guard, PredicTor performance did not improve com-
pared to Vanilla as much as in the high-congestion ex-
periment. The median improvements from the US and
DE were 4.2% and 7.3%, respectively. Wang et al. [42]
also state that CAR should get better performance during
high congestion times compared to low congestion.
We observed a slight improvement for PredicTor while
connected to a slow guard during both high and low
congestion for the median time (3.3% to 7.3% faster).
For slow guards with high congestion, PredicTor showed
larger improvements for the 90th percentile, between
14.0% and 19.1% improvement. Slow guards typically
act as a bottleneck in most circuits, but when congestion
is high, PredicTor can find and select faster circuits.
Circuit Distance. In Appendix A, Table 1, we show
the median and 90th percentile circuit distance improve-
ments for PredicTor compared to Vanilla. We observed
the best improvement in circuit distance for PredicTor
during times of low congestion while connected to a
fast guard. From the US location, there was a 52%
improvement in the median, with circuits that were ap-
proximately 1,600 km shorter. Similar results were ob-
served for the DE and JP locations. During times of high
congestion while connected to a fast guard, PredicTor
showed more modest improvements in circuit distance
of between 11% and 26% in the medians. We observed
little to no improvement in circuit distance for the slow
guard experiments. We believe this is due to the slow
guard acting as a bottleneck in most connections.
We conclude that PredicTor intelligently picks relays
in a way that has never been done by any other algo-
8
rithm. During times of high congestion, PredicTor cor-
rectly avoids highly congested nodes. During times of
low congestion, when there are fewer congested nodes to
avoid, PredicTor correctly builds lower-latency circuits
of shorter geographic distance.
6 CLASI: Client AS Inference
Since PredicTor and other Tor path selection algorithms
such as TAPS [23], DeNASA [6], and LASTor [1] use
network location information to select paths, it is impor-
tant to understand the extent to which these choices lead
to predictability and loss of anonymity. In particular, we
seek to understand whether an attacker can infer some-
thing about the location of the client from the choices of
paths that she makes.
To this end, we now describe CLASI, a metric for
measuring the ability of the attacker to infer the client
AS. CLASI is a challenge-response game between an
adversary and a challenger. The adversary possesses
a path simulator PS that is an idealized Tor network
with a given path selection algorithm to generate paths
over the sender space S, the relay space R, and the
destination space D. We denote one path P being
generated from PS as P ← PS, and a set of paths P
being generated from PS as P ← PS. Each path P
is a set of nodes where P = {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5}, such
that: p1 = clientIP, p2 = guardIP, p3 = middleIP,
p4 = exitIP, p5 = destinationIP.
Adversary A sends path simulator PS to the challenger
CH. CH generates a path P′ from PS and removes the
sender p′1 such that P
′ = {p′2, p′3, p′4, p′5}. CH then sends
P′ to A. A attempts to predict the network location L of
sender p′1. More precisely, L is the sender’s AS, and we
let SL be the set of all possible sender ASes. Then let L′
be A’s prediction for the location of the sender. Sender
location information leakage for the idealized Tor net-
work is then represented by εs, where:
Pr[L = L′] =
1
|SL| + εs.
There is no leakage (εs = 0) if the attacker can do no
better than guessing L′ uniformly at random from among
all possible sender ASes in SL. Otherwise, the attacker
has some advantage in guessing the sender’s AS (εs > 0).
The CLASI challenge-response game sequence is
shown in Figure 4. Adversary A uses the function
Predict(P) that extracts the features from the path P and
uses them to classify the AS of the sender. Each Tor
relay has the features AS, BW, and CC, represented as
described in Section 3, while the destination has the fea-
tures AS and CC. Predict uses a probabilistic classifi-
cation model that is trained on the feature set of paths
CH A
𝑃𝑃𝑃 ← 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷
𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑝𝑝′2,𝑝𝑝′3 𝑝𝑝′4,𝑝𝑝′5 ∩ 𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃'
𝐿𝐿′ ← 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑃𝑃𝑃)
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷
𝐿𝐿 ← 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑝𝑝′1)
𝐿𝐿𝑃
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿𝑃)
Figure 4: CLASI challenge-response game between ad-
versary and challenger.
generated from PS and labels that represent the sender’s
AS.
7 CLASI Evaluation
We now evaluate CLASI’s ability to measure sender lo-
cation information by running a simulation of the Tor
network using TorPS [39] and testing a location-aware
protocol called DeNASA [6].
7.1 Tor Model
TorPS [39] is a Tor path selection simulator that uses his-
torical data to recreate network conditions experienced
by Tor users in the real world [24]. Circuits are created
according to past network state, and streams are attached
to those circuits according to simulated user behavior.
For the set of destinations used in our simulation, we
tested the 200 top Alexa [2] websites. We modeled
clients connecting from the top 10 countries by directly
connecting users according to Tor Metrics [26]. The sim-
ulated clients connected from distinct ASes chosen partly
from the list proposed by Edmond and Syverson [14],
partly from the list proposed by Juen [25], and partly
from CAIDA Top Ranking ASes [9].
We tested four distinct users models: 1) 5-
destination, 2) 10-destination, 3) 15-destination, and 4)
20-destination. According to the number of destinations
specified for each user model, clients selected their des-
tinations uniformly at random from the set of 200 sites at
the start of the simulation. During the simulation, clients
connected to destinations selected uniformly at random
from this pre-selected set.
7.2 DeNASA Protocol
Location-aware protocols are designed to increase secu-
rity against AS-level threats [24], or the threat of BGP hi-
jacking attacks [37]. For our evaluation, we chose to test
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Figure 5: Fraction of vulnerable streams for DeNASA
e-select compared to Vanilla with respect to AS adver-
saries.
a location-aware protocol called DeNASA (destination-
naive AS-awareness) because DeNASA’s tunable param-
eters allow users to increase or decrease location aware-
ness in exchange for more or less security against AS-
level adversaries respectively. We would expect, how-
ever, that increasing location awareness would cause an
increase in sender information leakage.
DeNASA increases security against AS-level adver-
saries by creating circuits that have higher probability
of avoiding some Tier 1 ASes from the client to guard,
and simultaneously from exit to destination. Barton et al.
identify eight Tier 1 ASes, called suspect ASes that are
the most likely to appear on both sides of Tor circuits.
The two methods used in DeNASA are: 1) e-select,
and 2) g-select. E-select determines how clients select
exit relays based on a tunable parameter τ ranging from
0 to 1. When τ = 0.1 clients are restricted to selecting
from a smaller set of exits that have lower probability
of traversing the suspect ASes. Additionally, the set of
exits available for each client is dependent on the client’s
location. As τ increases, the restriction is relaxed.
Using the described TorPS configuration, we ran a
nine month simulation for e-select τ = 0.1 and Vanilla.
We denoted streams as being vulnerable if AS3356 or
AS1299 appeared on both sides of the stream. As shown
in Fig. 5, the median vulnerable stream rate for e-select
and Vanilla was 8% and 22% respectively – indicating
that e-select builds 63% fewer vulnerable streams com-
pared to Vanilla.
The g-select method ensures that clients only select
guards for which there are no suspect ASes in the AS-
level path from client to guard. The suspect AS list is
tunable such that the client can avoid from one to eight
suspect ASes. By avoiding more suspect ASes from the
client side, clients maintain a more restrictive set of pos-
sible guards to choose. Additionally, the set of guards
available for each client is dependent on the client’s lo-
cation.
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7.3 Experiments
For each experiment, we generated 1.8 million Tor paths
to train the CLASI adversary classification model. We
then ran the CLASI challenge-response game for 3,000
new paths on which the adversary made prediction at-
tempts. For each data point, this process was repeated
30 times and we plot the mean along with a 95% confi-
dence interval. In Figure 6, we plot sender AS leakage
for different variants of e-select compared to vanilla Tor.
The Figure indicates that sender AS leakage is higher
for e-select compared to vanilla Tor. Moreover, sender
AS leakage increases for e-select as the threshold τ is
decreased. For example, for the 5-, 10-, 15-, and 20-
destination user models, sender AS leakage increased by
7%, 10%, 11%, and 13%, respectively, for τ = 0.1 com-
pared to τ = 0.2. We found similar results when τ was
increased from 0.2 to 0.3. This was expected due to the
set of exits being more restrictive for clients when using
lower values for τ .
Also as expected, as user destinations increased,
sender leakage decreased for all path selection algo-
rithms. More specifically, for Vanilla Tor, sender AS
leakage decreased by 26% for the 10-destination user
model compared to the 5-destination user model, by
14% for the 15-destination user model compared to
the 10-destination user model, and by 12% for the 20-
destination user model compared to the 15-destination
user model.This highlights the impact that the user model
may have on security results. Moreover, we note that
CLASI is sensitive to changing user models and should
be a useful tool for researchers seeking to gain more un-
derstanding of security implications for their proposed
path selection algorithms under different user models.
Figure 7 shows sender AS leakage for DeNASA guard
selection variations compared to Vanilla Tor. Sender
AS leakage was not significantly different for Vanilla
Tor compared to g-select when two to four suspect
ASes were avoided. On the other hand, there was a
14% increase in leakage for when six suspect ASes
were avoided compared to when four suspect ASes were
10
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avoided. Similarly, there was an 8% increase in leakage
for when eight suspect ASes were avoided compared to
when six suspect ASes were avoided.
7.4 Entropy Based Metrics
To understand the value of CLASI as an anonymity met-
ric, it is necessary to see the results of other anonymity
metrics. In this section, we show results for DeNASA
using two anonymity metrics, Gini coefficient [34] and
Uniformity degree [11].
In Figure 8 we plot Gini coefficient and uniformity
degree for DeNASA exit selection variants compared to
Vanilla Tor. The x-axis shows the number of user desti-
nations. The two measures have an inverse relationship.
As Gini coefficient grows, anonymity goes down, while
as uniformity degree grows, anonymity goes up. We see
that both measures show little difference for different val-
ues of the threshold τ or the number of user destinations.
In contrast, CLASI does show a significant differences
in sender location leakage as these parameters vary. This
highlights an advantage for CLASI, in that it can be used
by researchers to understand the anonymity impact of
path selection algorithms under various user models in
Tor.
Additionally, there was not a significant change in
Gini coefficient for Vanilla compared to DeNASA’s exit
selection variants. This anomaly highlights a signif-
icant disadvantage for Gini coefficient in measuring
anonymity for path selection algorithms in Tor. The re-
sult is due to the fact that Gini coefficient is a measure
of equality of relay selection for all clients in the anony-
mous communication system taken together. As an ex-
treme example, suppose that all Tor users are split evenly
into users from country A and those from country B.
Also suppose that all Tor relays are also split into two
groups with equal bandwidths. If all users from coun-
try A select only relays from the first group and country
B users from the second group, then the Gini coefficient
will be the same as Vanilla Tor, even though the choice
of relays clearly indicates which country the user is in.
Thus, Gini coefficient is not suitable for understanding
anonymity loss when clients use some bias relevant to
their location to select paths.
There was a significant decrease in uniformity de-
gree for DeNASA’s exit selection variants compared to
Vanilla Tor. However, there was no significant change in
Uniformity Degree with respect to changing values of τ
for the three DeNASA exit selection variants themselves.
On the other hand, CLASI did show a significant differ-
ence in anonymity among the three DeNASA exit selec-
tion variants. This shows a disadvantage for uniformity
degree in measuring anonymity for path selection algo-
rithms in Tor.
In Figure 9 we plot Gini Coefficient and Uniformity
Degree for DeNASA’s guard selection variants compared
to Vanilla Tor for the 5-destination user model. The re-
sults indicate a loss in anonymity, as Gini Coefficient sig-
nificantly increased for all three g-select variants com-
pared to Vanilla Tor. However, there was no significant
change in Gini coefficient among the three variants of
g-select.
There was no significant change in uniformity degree
for Vanilla compared to DeNASA’s guard selection vari-
ants. This shows that uniformity degree did not indi-
cate that there was a guard placement attack vulnerabil-
ity even if clients were configured to avoid up to eight
suspect ASes while selecting their guard nodes.
We conclude that gini coefficient and uniformity de-
gree are not sufficient replacements for the CLASI metric
when measuring anonymity of path selection algorithms
in Tor.
7.5 Time To First Compromise
Time to first compromise is an all-or-nothing measure
of how long it takes until a client uses a compromised
circuit [24]. Using the TorPS configuration described in
Section 7.1, we ran a nine-month simulation for e-select
11
 Gin
i Co
effi
cie
nt
0.75
0.8
0.85
Un
ifo
rm
ity
 De
gre
e
0.75
0.8
0.85
Path Selection Algorithm
Vanilla g−select_2
g−select_4
g−select_6
g_select_8
Gini Coefficient
Uniformity Degree
Figure 9: Gini Coefficient and Uniformity Degree for
DeNASA guard selection variants compared to Vanilla
Tor.
 
CD
F F
rac
tio
n o
f C
lien
ts
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
Weeks
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
e_select_0.1
Vanilla
Figure 10: Time to first compromise for DeNASA e-
select compared to Vanilla Tor
τ = 0.1 and Vanilla. We denoted streams as being vulner-
able if AS3356 or AS1299 appeared on both sides of the
stream. As shown in Figure 10, approximately 60% of
Vanilla and e-select clients built at least one vulnerable
stream within the first two weeks. After the nine month
period, approximately 80% of Vanilla and e-select clients
built at least one vulnerable stream. On the other hand,
according to Figure 5, DeNASA builds 63% fewer vul-
nerable streams with respect to AS adversaries compared
to Vanilla. Therefore, some DeNASA clients should re-
alize some security improvement compared to Vanilla
clients because they build less vulnerable streams, even
though the time taken for DeNASA clients to build their
first vulnerable stream is similar to Vanilla Tor.
The results indicate that DeNASA e-select τ = 0.1
provides approximately the same security against AS-
level adversaries with respect to time to first compromise,
and better security against AS-level adversaries with re-
spect to vulnerable stream rate. Conversely, in Figure 6,
CLASI shows a security reduction in client AS leakage
of 11% for e-select τ = 0.1 compared to Vanilla. These
contrasting results support our assertion that time to first
compromise alone is not sufficient in fully understand-
ing the security implications of path selection algorithms.
Though time to first compromise is an important metric,
we point out that other metrics including CLASI should
be used when measuring anonymity for path selection al-
gorithms in Tor.
8 PredicTor Security Evaluation
To understand the anonymity level of PredicTor and Pre-
dicTor+CAR compared to CAR and Vanilla, we first gen-
erated 500,000 paths for each algorithm from the Shadow
experiment described in Section 3. Then, we measured
anonymity of each path selection algorithm using Gini
coefficent, Uniformity degree, and CLASI.
Figure 11 shows Gini coefficient and Uniformity de-
gree for all tested algorithms. The Gini coefficient was
0.21 higher for PredicTor over Vanilla and 0.25 higher
for PredicTor+CAR over Vanilla. According to the
Gini coefficient metric, Vanilla and CAR had similar
anonymity while PredicTor and PredicTor+CAR had sig-
nificantly worse anonymity. These results suggest that
PredicTor clients select some relays with higher proba-
bility and avoid other relays, causing an inequality in re-
lay selection compared to Vanilla. In contrast, there was
a slight decrease in Uniformity degree for PredicTor and
PredicTor+CAR compared to CAR and Vanilla.
In Figure 12, we plot sender AS leakage using CLASI
for PredicTor and PredicTor+CAR compared to CAR
and Vanilla. We found that PredicTor clients had simi-
lar AS leakage compared to Vanilla, likely due to clients
choosing paths independently of their location in Predic-
Tor. On the other hand, CAR clients build paths based
on opportunistic measurement from the client, and thus,
their paths should have some relationship to their lo-
cation. Accordingly, we found a slight increase in AS
leakage for CAR and a significant increase of about 9%
for PredicTor+CAR compared to Vanilla and PredicTor
alone. We note that both Gini coefficient and Unifor-
mity degree did not indicate a significant difference in
anonymity for PredicTor+CAR compared to PredicTor.
From our findings, we conclude that AS leakage for
PredicTor is similar to Vanilla and slightly better than
CAR due to PredicTor clients building paths indepen-
dently of network location. On the other hand, PredicTor
does select certain relays with higher probability causing
an inequality in relay selection compared to Vanilla and
CAR. However, the entropy loss is minimal, indicating
that the distribution of selected relays for all PredicTor
clients is similar to Vanilla.
Time to First Compromise Johnson et al. [24] showd
that time to first compromise is strongly related to guard
selection policy. As PredicTor chooses guards exactly
the same as Vanilla, we believe time to first compromise
for PredicTor due to relay-level and AS-level adversaries
should be similar to Vanilla Tor.
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9 Discussion and Future Work
In this section, we discuss deployment ideas for Predic-
Tor and future work possibilities for CLASI.
9.1 PredicTor Deployment
There are two main challenges that would need to be ad-
dressed for the successful deployment of PredicTor: 1)
clients should routinely receive comprehensive training
data, and 2) the training data should be gathered securely,
such that an adversary has little chance of directing traf-
fic to malicious relays.
In the Live Tor experiments, we built a training set
by measuring download times for approximately 50,000
streams from a centralized authority over the course of
one hour. This training set was given to a PredicTor
client and used to build circuits during the subsequent
hour. Gathering the training data added an additional
load on the Network of approximately 4.0 GiB/hr, or just
.07 GiB/s. The current bandwidth of the Tor Network is
approximately 60 GiB/s. Thus, we believe that the mea-
surement load should not be a problem for deployment.
Similar to the Tor consensus, the training set should be
sent to each client once per hour. We believe this should
not be problematic because our training set was approx-
imately 233 KB. Adding this information to the consen-
sus would result in a file size increase of only 10%.
In a live deployment of PredicTor, the training data
can be gathered by one single authority or by multiple
authorities. If the data is gathered by one authority, then
that authority should be trusted. If the training data is
gathered by multiple authorities, then there should be a
voting process that is used to resist manipulation from a
subset of malicious authorities.
Additionally, PredicTor measurement circuits should
be made indistinguishable from regular circuits by ran-
domizing the destination domain and payload size of the
measured stream. We note that using RTT measurements
for performance is fundamentally insecure because they
can easily be manipulated by malicious exit relays.
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Figure 12: Sender AS leakage
9.2 CLASI
Adversary Model. The adversary model within the
CLASI challenge-response game is an all-knowing ad-
versary. Therefore, our results yield an upper bound.
Meiser et al. [5] showed that a budget adversary model
results in a tight upper bound. The CLASI adversary
model can be modified such that the adversary’s knowl-
edge is bounded by their budget. The budget can be de-
fined in terms of cost or bandwidth, for example.
Sender/Receiver Anonymity. CLASI is designed to
measure AS leakage from the sender. However, the clas-
sification model can be modified to also measure AS
leakage from the receiver. This could give researchers
even more insight into anonymity implications, espe-
cially for destination-aware path selection algorithms
that use destination information to build circuits [35, 14].
10 Conclusion
To address Tor performance, we presented PredicTor, a
path selection technique that uses a Random Forest clas-
sifier trained on a set of recent Tor paths to predict the
performance of a proposed path. We implemented Pre-
dicTor in the Tor source code and showed through simu-
lations in Shadow that PredicTor improved Tor network
performance by 23% compared to Vanilla Tor and by
13% compared to Congestion-Aware Routing. In our
live Tor experiments, during times of high congestion,
PredicTor had an improvement of 7% to 13% in the me-
dian case compared to Vanilla Tor. We evaluated the
anonymity of PredicTor using standard entropy-based
metrics, and we proposed a new anonymity metric called
CLASI: Client Autonomous System Inference. Our re-
sults indicated that CLASI showed anonymity loss for
location-aware path selection algorithms where other en-
tropy based metrics showed little to no loss of anonymity.
Additionally, CLASI indicated that PredicTor had simi-
lar client AS leakage compared to Vanilla due to Predic-
Tor building circuits that are independent of client loca-
tion.
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Appendices
A Client Location and Guard Diversity
In Table 1, we show the median and 90th percentile
performance and circuit distance improvements for Pre-
dicTor compared to Vanilla.
Date & Time CC Guard Cong.
Time Distance
Median 90th per. Median 90th per.
2017-07-18 00:00 US Fast Low 4.2% 15.6% 52.0% 16.5%
2017-07-19 14:00 US Fast High 9.7% 17.7% 23.0% 10.8%
2017-09-01 00:00 US Slow Low 4.4% 6.3% 2.2% −1.2%
2017-08-31 14:00 US Slow High 6.7% 19.1% −1.0% −5.2%
2017-08-15 00:00 DE Fast Low 7.3% 23.1% 29.4% 16.2%
2017-08-03 14:00 DE Fast High 12.8% 25.3% 26.2% 21.8%
2017-08-22 00:00 DE Slow Low 3.3% 2.6% 2.0% 5.9%
2017-08-17 14:00 DE Slow High 6.9% 16.9% 0.0% 0.0%
2017-08-30 00:00 JP Fast Low 7.4% 11.2% 28.8% 18.0%
2017-08-29 14:00 JP Fast High 6.3% 10.8% 11.3% 10.9%
2017-08-24 00:00 JP Slow Low 7.2% 4.5% 1.8% 0.0%
2017-08-25 14:00 JP Slow High 7.3% 14.0% 2.1% 4.1%
Table 1: Improvements in download time and circuit dis-
tance for PredicTor compared to Vanilla.
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